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In the Supreme Court of Iha Stale of Utah
It\LE W. DEMILLE, Administrator
tile Jj~state of Terry Lee DeMille
aml Constance Hope DeMille, also
known m; Connie DeMille, deceased,

(11'

Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No.
11385

l'lfYLLTS ERICKSON, Administratrix
uf the Estate of Frederick Kenneth
'-lpe11rllovP, ch•ceased,

Defendant and Appellant.

i>LA INTIFF AND RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STA'l1El\1ENT OF CASE
De::\[ille and his wife, Constance Hope Dedt>fernlant's d<'cedent, Frederick Kenneth
:-ipr·ndlon•, ·wL•re killed August 11, 1965, when their auto11111hi!Ps collided on U. S. Highway 191 thirteen or four1 ·11 mi l<>s son th of Cedar City. The DeMilles left two
•11 1110r el1ildn•n surviving, a daughter, Lisa Lee DeMille,
1 1
., • :-;ix. and a son, 'l'erry Greg DeMille, age two. Plaintiff
:'1 11 11;.d1t :-;uit as Admini:-;trator on behalf of the two minor
11
' ildr<·n to n·eovPr damag<•s for the wrongful death of
T\'l'I')' LP<'

.\! ill<', and

11
'

"''II'

Jl<ll"<'llt:->.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the close of the evidence, defendant moved the
Court to find Terry Lee DeMille negligent as a matter of
law and to dismiss the action for failure to prove negligence on the part of Frederick Kenneth Spendlove. 'l\.rn
Lee DeMille was driving the DeMille car. The Trial Conrt
granted defendant's motion as to Terry Lee DeMille and
instructed the jury that no recovery could be had for hio
death as a matter of law (Instructions 12 and 13). Thl'
Court submitted the case to the jury as to the wrongful
death of Constance Hope DeMille and the jury retnrnPtl
a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $23,000.00.
Defendant's post trial motion for judgment n.o.v.

\\'ao

deniPd.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal or a new trial and pla[ntiff seeks to have the judgment affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff is in general agreement with most of tl 11
facts stated in ddendant's brid. IIo-wever, tlwrn an•

S\''

eral significant omissions and inaccuracies therein "-hi"i'
n'quire C'orrection.
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Officer Mason testified the morning of the accident
1rns clear and visibility was good (Tr. 20, 28). He ob-

Terry Lee DeMille and Constance DeMille at the
Phillips station in Cedar City at 6 :30 or 6 :40 a.m. on the
111orning of the accident. They were dressed up, their
automohile was clean and Terry Lee DeMille was wide
a\\'ake and normal. (Tr. 16, 18). The accident was reportPd at 6 :55 a.m. (Tr. 23). Officer Burch testified that
vitlihility from the wrecked vehicles on the highway was
~cvPcral hnndred yards both north and south of the scene
(Tr. 28). There was nothing to obstruct the vision of
Mr. Sp(•ndlove in seeing the De~ifille vehicle coming from
tiH•north (Tr. 72).
~l:'.rved

Officer Burch constructed a diagram before the jury
,110\\'ing the physical facts found after the accident.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5). This diagram and photographs
(Plaintiff's Exhibits G and 8) show the scene of the ac1·i1lPnt as it appeared from the north looking sonth (Tr.
·r

..... / l

').o
"")
·)l~, ,-)-;-}

•

Ol'ficer Burch testified that a sharp gouge mark
11mubered Point 6 on Exhibit 5 was nearest the center
1.1hite line•. It ran to the edge of the white line (Tr. 51, 54).
'l'ltp white line was five inches wide (Tr. 30). In the

i1;1in1on of Sergeant Reid, this gouge was made by a sharp
1101'1ion
d11\'Pn
'

1

1' t]1p

of the undercarriage of the Volkswagen being
b;,, defendant's decedent when the undercarriage
\Tolkswagen collapsed (Tr. 169, 171). Plaintiff's

4

Exhibit 13 is a close-up photograph of this mark. Offo.et
Reid testified it \Vas made by a sharp portion of the fraiw;
and not by the left front wheel (Tr.169, 171, 174).
Between Point 6 and the point designated as Point
1 on Plaintiff's Exhibits 5 and 6 were several scrapes,
scratches and gouges in the highway. Point 1 on Exhihib;
5 and 6 designates the farthest mark north (Tr. 35). 11
was a rubber scuff mark about twenty inches wide with
a scrape in the center. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 4 and G).
The center of this mark was forty-nine inches from th1
center of the white center line (Tr. 32). The easternmo~t
(•dge of this mark was sixty inches from the cPntPr of tltl'
white line (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, Tr. 33). rrhe onbi<l1'
dimension of the 1962 Volkswagen was sixty inche8 anJ
the distance from the outside of one front tire to tlw outside of the otlwr front tire was fift)'-fom inches ('l'r. 5-±i
'l'o the south of these marks one hundred five inches frolll
Point No. 1 was a skid mark commencing at a voint

011 1•

foot seven inches into the west lane and running

1'a~t

towards the point at whirh the VolkswagPn came to

iw!

'l'he north bPginning point of this skid mark was identi
fied as Point 2 on I~xhibits 5 and 6 (Tr. :-35, 36). Offic•
Bnrch testi fit>d that this skid mark was made h.1· ti, ..
1

\Tolkswagen (Tr. 37). The point of impact was plact'd 1.1
Officer Burch and Rngeant RP.id at the- area of tlw

g-nu~'

marks rnarkPd as Point l and () on Exhibits 5 aud
'rlwse marks and the

serap<~

marks lwtwePn tlwm \\

1

1

;

1
'

5
by tl1e Volkswagen at the time of impact (Tr. 96).
The point of maximum engagement could have been at
f'oint 6 (Tr. 184, 185).

11rnue

rclie photograph marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 shows

thP position of the Volkswagen after the accident. The
photograph marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 shows the
damage to the front of the Volkswagen. The front end was
collapsPd and its wheels were collapsed to the right.

t

The bodies of Frederick Kenneth Spendlove and a
~Ir. Condie ·were both on the left-hand side of the Volksll'agm at the place where the Volkswagen came to rest.
Jn the opinion of Officer Burch, both were thrown from
tliG Volkswagen as it came off the paved portion of the
highway onto the gravel shoulder (Tr. 113). There were
110 skid marks or other markings on the highway to indi1·ah• any action ·was taken by the Volkswagen to stop or
11thP1wise avoid the collision (Tr. 63, 64). The northl1n1rnd traffic lane (the Volkswagen's side of the road)
11a;; sixtee>n f PPt four inclws wide at the point of impact
('l'r. 29).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO DIRECT
I VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT.

':t1 he oft repeated principle upon which the instant
1

must be resoh'ed is that the issue of negligence is a
111n· isslw unless the evidence or lack thereof is so clear
a~c·

6
that reasonable minds cannot differ. Hindmarsh v. 0.1!.
Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 (19G8J:
Gibbs v. Blue Cab Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P.2d 213 (19~1~1
and Aagard v. Dayton & Miller Red-E-lllix Co11crete Co ..
12 Utah 2d 34, 3Gl P.2d 582 (1960). If there is support
in the evidence for the jury verdict, it must be affimJPd.
Of course, every reasonable inference must be resolnd
in favor of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that the presumption of dnc cm
much stressed in defendant's brief was not applicable to
the case and that the Trial Court should not have giwn
the jury Instruction 22 concerning it.
Wood v. Strei:ell-Patterson Hardware Co., 6 Utal1 2d
340, 313 P.2d 800 (1957) dealt most recently with this
presumption a it rt>laks to a no eyewitness head-on col
lision. rl'lw Court observed there ·was great confusion H'
to the presumption hut held that certain infc~rences of fad
arose from conditions existing on the highway at the point
of impact from which negligence from being on the wro11.~
side of the highway could be presumed. This was son'gardless of the fact that the driver was not alin~ to ('\plain wh~- he was over the line. Physical evidence alow
was held sufficient to support the Trial Court's findi11.~
of negligen<'<'.

As pointt>d ont hy .J usticc'. ·wolfe in his dissent in~
opinion in Mec71r1111 v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 79, 2G2 P.'..!d 2:-::i
(1953), tlw pn·smnption of duP care should he gi\'P11 lilli

7
force and should disappear in the face of any evidence of
latk of due care since the real inquiry is how the actors
adPd in the case before the Court.

Plaintiff submits that if any presumption applies in
thl' instant case it is a presumption of negligence on the
jJart of both drivers for being partially on the wrong side
of the road at the time of impact. Morrison v. Perry,
111-l: TTtah 151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943). Experience certainly
shows that accidents usnally do not happen absent fault
on the part of the drivers and that a careful experienced
(lriwr will nParly always h<~ able to avoid accidents with
fa11lty dl'ivers. rrhe Court went so far as to state in Gibbs
1. TJ/1w Call Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P.2d 213 (1952),
tltt1t "\Ve have been prone to assmne that someone
li<t\'P

:11

niitst

lwrn guilty in an intersection collision." 249 P.2d

'.'.1 (i. rl'll<' prPsnrnption of due

can~

exists merely as a

1:rnr(·dural d('vice requiring he who asserts the contrary
lo

go l'orwarcl ·with tht• proof. If the proof shows a driver

l 1l lut\'<' lw<'n
;in

violating a rnle of tlw road at the instant

:w1·id<'nt oecnn;, it is manifestly reasonable to presume

(':tnsativ<' n<>gligence from the violation. He is caught as
it

\1 <'l'P

in the v<>ry act and has himself rebutted the gen-

r·ral

pn'snmption of clue care which might otherwise ap-

11k.

A<'.eordingly, plaintiff submits that no instruction

• 111

tli<e prPsnmption of dne care should have been given.

(!hurla

1·.

Rose, 5 Utah 2d 39, 296 P.2d 287 (1956); cf.

w,J,lr/ /'. 8trr1•rll-Patterson Hardware Co., S1tpra.

8

The rules of the road applicable to Frederick Ken
neth Spendlove at the time and place of the accidPnt wel'f'
as defined by the Trial Court in Instruction No. 24:
It was the duty of the decedent Frederick
Kenneth Spendlove to use reasonable care under
the circumstances in driving his car to avoid danger to himself and others and to observe and be
aware of the condition of the highway, the traffitthEffeon, and other existing conditions; in that l'Pgard, he was obliged:

A. To use reasonable care to keep a look
out for other vehicles and obstacles or othn conditions n~asonably to he anticipated.
B. To keep his car under reasonably saf(
and proper control.
C. Upon a landed highway to drive as nearly
as practicable entirely within a single lane awl
not to move from one lane to another until tl1e
driver has first ascertained that he can do so \rilh
reasonahle saft>ty.
D. To driv(~ his automobile on his own right
side that is, the east side of tht> highway.
11J. To keep a lookont for persons and otlw 1•
vehicles upon tlw highway, and whenwT it aprwn 1'
to be reasonahlv m'cessarv in the exercise of d111 •
can~ for thP sa f~ty of hims.elf or others, to tnrn liic
vehirle to tli<> ontsid<· of tlw highway to iwoid n
collision.
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Failure of the said Frederick Kenneth Spendlove to operate his automobile in accordance with
the foregoing requirements of the law would constitute negligence on his part.
rl'he duties defined in Instruction 24 are founded at
ll'ast in part in the following Utah statutes:
No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway
at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent
under the conditions and having regard to the
actual and potential hazards then existing. In
Pvery event speed shall be so controlled as may be
Il<'eessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conve:vance on or entering the
highwa>r in compliance with legal requirements
and the dnty of all persons to use due care. Section 4l-G-4G(l), Utah Code Annotated (1953).
Fpon all roadways of sufficient width a veshall hP driven upon the right half of the
rnadwa>- ... Section 41-6-53(a), Utah Code Annotn tPd ( 10!'):3).

liiel!~

Driwrs of n'hiclPs proceeding in opposite
din,ctions shall pass each other to the right and
tqJon roadways having width for not more than
one lane of traffic in each direction, each driver
shall give to the other at least one-half of the main
trawl0d portion of the roadway as nearly as possil)!P. S<>ction 41-6-54, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
\VhPnever any roadwavs has been divided
into two or more ~learlv rna~ked lanes for traffic
th<> following rules in addition to all others consistPnt 11er0with slrnll appl:v:
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(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as
practical entirely within a single lane and shall
not be moved from such lane until the driver ha,,
first ascertained that such movement can lw
made with safety. Section 41-6-61(a), Utah Co<lP
Annotated (1953).
Having the duty of the defendant's decedent in view,
the jury could reasonably find from the evidence:
1. The DeMille car was headed south at the
time of the accident. The DeMilles had left Cedar City
to travel to Las Vegas that morning and were obst~rverl
at a Cedar City service station just twenty minutes hefore
the accident. In Tuttle v. Intermountain Express Co,.
121 Utah 48, 242 P.2d 764 (1952), a similar finding 011
similar evidence was held reasonable even though t\\'0
eyt>wihwsses tt>stifit>d to the contrary.

2. The Spendlove automobile was traveling north
at the time of the accident. The position of tlw
skids, scrapes and gouges found at the point of irnpal't
and the fact the DeMille automobile was headed soutl 1
prior to the accident and the position of the automobi!Ps
on the highvmy after the collision leave no room for an,1
other conclusion.
3.

Defendant's

decedent

negligently

failed tu

k0e-p a proper lookout. rrhe day ·was clear and visibilit 1
nnol1strnctt>d looking s<'veral lrnndrt>d yards up the higlt

11

way north to the place of the accident. No skid marks or
other marks on the highway showed that defendant's dec·cdent even saw the DeMille automobile before the collision. Ba1imler v. Hazelwood, 347 S.W. 2d 560 (Tex.
1%1), and Wilson v. Barnes, 224 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Ct.
Civ. App. 1949).
4. Defendant's decedent failed to keep his car
nnder reasonably safe and proper control. The damage
to the automobiles and the positions at which they came
lo rest show they collided with great force and that the
\'olhwagen had been traveling at great speed prior to
the impact. No evidence of evasive action existed on the
part of defendant's decedent. The very fact the accident
11c(•ttrred on a clear straight stretch of road gives rise to
nn inforence of lack of proper control.
5. Defendant's decedent nt>gligently failed to keep
his automobile properly within his own lane; neglig-1•ntly moved therefrom when he could not do so with
rPasonahle safrty; negligentl!' failed to keep right and
negligently failed to turn right to avoid a collision. A
µ;onge mark running to the white center line was made by
a "harp portion of the Volkswagen's undercarriage. The
<'<'11kr of the scuff mark made by the Volkswagen's right
lrnnt tirP and wheel was only forty-nine inches from the

""11t<>r line, whereas the outside dimension of the Volks\\ ag·<·n
1!

;1g-<·n

was sixty inches. A skid mark made by the Volksin the collision commenced one foot seven inches

J2

in the west lane. The northbound traffic lane was sixken
feet four inches wide at the point of collision. From tht-oe
uncontroverted facts, the jury could reasonably find that '
the Volkswagen ·was well acro:o;s the center line at tlie
moment of impact. Viewing the facts in the light rno~t
favorable to plaintiff, the Court must assume that the
Volkswagen was across the center line at the time of the
collision. Furthermore, if it had only been riding thP
white line or traveling close to the white line, such conduct under the circumstances was negligent as a matter
of law. Farrell v. Camrron, 98 Utah 68, 94 P.2d 106~
(1939); Foder v. Interstate Transit Lines, 86 P.2d 57-1
(Kan. 1939); In re Starer's Estate, 383 P.2d 95G (Kan.
19()8); Gerard v. Peasley, 403 P.2d 45 (Wash. 19o5); In
T<' Armstrong's Estate, 311 P.2d 281 (Kan. 1957); Trnc11
n. GitiMini, G6 P.2cl 675 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal. 1937); a11 l
Rller n. Uniterl States, lrifi F. Supp. 273 (vV.D.N.C. 1%7).
1

At i.IH• moment of impact the VolkswagPn was aero~,;
the white center linP in violation of an express provi~io11
of the statute, ·while at least ek•ven feet of 01H'n 11nohstrncted roadway n•rnainPd for its use in its own IHJ11'.
The total ahsence of marks on the highway show it mad('
no effort to stop or turn right to avoid the Dr:\lilk
antmnobik•. Plaintiff concedes that thr rPaosn !'or t\ 11
prP:-;pnce of thP Dc•.Mille antomobi!P acrnss th<> c<'nll'l
linP at tlw point of impac-t is nnelear. NFY<'rtli<>I"""· i1 i'
el<·ar that T'<;ny L<•c• J)p-;\Jille had just \pft 'Ct>dar ('it\ to
start a trip. F'irt<·<·11 minut<>s lwforp the accident k \\'!I"
lirig·lit and alc'rt and 1ya:~ <lriYing a c\pan, was!H·rl a11t
1

'

13
mohilP. The Conrt refused to allow presentation of his
P:-.cell<•nt driving record to the jury. No evidence was
pn'sPnted by defendant as to how long the Volkswagen
J1ad been on the road that hour of the morning. From the
]JOsition of the damage to the Volkswagen and the fact
tlie skid mark left by one of the Volkswagen's rear tires
eo11mtenced in the west lane, the jury could reasonably
find that the Vollrnwagen was headed not straight up the
highway but angling northeast to get back in its own
lane at the time of the collision and that the DeMille automobile had crossed the center line to avoid striking the
\'olks11'agen.
Ln any rvent, the physical evidence showing the place
111' impact alone> fully supports a sufficient inference of
1wgligence on the vart of defendant's decedent to justify
th8 'l'rial Conrt in submitting the issne of his negligence
lo

tl1t1 jllry.

Ln Farrell v. Cameron, sitpra, the plaintiff 1,yas inj1u·pd while riding as a passenger in an automobile which
''l1l'l'oadwd tweln-' to sixken inches over the center line
and eollidNl with defendant's automobile. The defendant
kul rai]('d to slow down or turn to the right in a\'Oidance
11

1 iii(• eoilision. The Conrt stressed tht> following princi-

111··:- npplieah\P l!PrP:
1.
:111

It makes no differencP which of two drivers in

:\('('i(l<•nt was the rnon: 1wgligent. If the defendant was
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negligent and his guilt was a proximate cause of the accident, the plaintiff can recover.
2. Every driver who is taking reasonable care will
not consider whether an approaching driver is on his
side of the road or not where he has ample time and space
to do so but will move over and not take a chance and
avoid a collision. Failure so to do is negligence.
3. A statute requires drivers to drive as close t0
the right hand curb or edge as possible. Where a driver
is traveling within sixteen inches of the center line at a
point on the highway where there is ample space to driv1·
enough nearer the right hand edge of highway to avoid a
collision, his failure to <lo so is negligence.
4. It is the duty of the driver who is on his right
hand side of the street to use reasonable care to avoid a
collision enm if the approaching car is being driven on
the ·wrong side of the street in violation of the law of tlw
road.
5. The issue is always a question of fact and to
justify overturning the lower Court the Supreme Conrl
must find no negligence as a matter of law.
G. Although one is more negligent than the otlw 1
in a head-on colfo>ion, tlw negligence of each driwr oec1ir
ring concurrently and simnltaneously is a proxirnate
cause of thP collision.

15
In a concurring opinion Justice Pratt stated:
Even though one driver is upon the wrong
side of the road, the approaching driver who is on
his proper side is not relieved of the duty of exercising reasonable care to avoid a collision. The
latter may asusme that the former will resume his
proper side, but that assumption, of course, does
not remain with him indefinitely. There may come
the time when a reasonably prudent person would
realize that he, who is on the wrong side of the
road, is not going to resume his proper position.
If, when this realization should arise in the mind
of the driver approaching upon his proper side of
the road, he, through inability to see, or by reason
of speed, is unable to exercise control of his car,
then he is negligent; and where the circumstances
are such that had he controlled his car as a reasonably prudent person would have done, he could
have avoided the collision, then his negligence
was a proximate cause thereof.

Jn Foder v. Interstate Transit Lines, sitpra, the evi1l<•ncP

was in conflict as to whether the truck or the bus

inrn]\·pd had encroaclwd upon or across the center line.
'l'h(·n~

was evidence that the bus was at least hugging

tlw center line at the time of impact. The Court stated:
The fact is that the wheels of each vehicle
could be on the right side of the middle mark,
bnt right up to it, and due to the part of each vehicle that extends beyond the wheels a collision
snrh as WE' have hne could have taken place.
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. . . both drivers were negligent under thl'
circumstances in being right up to the middle
mark regardless of which one crossed it.
The plaintiff, a passenger in the bus, was held entitled
to recovf'r.

Gerard v. Peasley, 403 P.2d 45 (Wash. 1965), involved a collision betwef'n a pick-up and a Volkswagen
on a curve on a dark rainy night. The evidence was conflicting as to which vehicle had encroached over the rt'n
ter line so the Court affirmed a verdict for tlw plaintiff
holding the conflid a mattf'r for the jnry.
In re Armtsrong's Estate, 311 P.2d (Kan. 1957), in
volved a no eyewitnc>ss head-on collision on a straight
road on a clear day. rrirn road ran east and west. It 11w
twt>nt~·-six fr<>t wi<l<~ and was marked ·with a ct>nt(']' liIH'
with thirtven feet on each side. A windrow of graV('l wn.
on the north half of the north lane. It varied from fonr
and one-half feet to six feet wide, leaving seven fed in 1h
north lane. Vehicle A was traveling east, Vehicle H we~d.
V<>hicle A was obserYed by several to be encroarliiu;.;
aeross the centf'r line as it traveled east lwfore tlw rol
lision. Y<'hicle H left skid marks tlm:•e feet across 11 11
cmter li1w prior to tlw collision. The l<'ft four-fifth'
of each YPhiclc• had collidvd. Tlwre was room for Y(·lticl ·
H to traYPl in thv north lmw lwtwePn tl1<• windrow and
th<' centPr lin<'. r111ic· rl'rial Conrt disrnissed H's l'HS!' ai'tet
his <'V; dPnCP \YHS pn ·~'<'llfrd. 'l'lH' Sn prelll<' Coll rt n·yel':I'• !
1
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basis the evidence was for the jury since reasonable minds could differ as to negligence and cause. A
rfosenting opinion stated the facts showed contributory
negligence on the part of Vehicle H as a matter of law
~inre H was charged by law with seeing the approach
of \T ehicle A and with knowing the condition of the road
at bme and place. In the exercise of due care H could
have avoided a collision with Vehicle A even though
\'l•hicle A was encroaching on H's side of the road. H
liad amplP room to avoid the collision if H had stayed on
hi~ Ride of the road. The 1Court cited the rule that where
both \"t>hicles crowd the center, both are deemed neglig('nt
a~ a mattPr of law.
un the

Tracy v. Gitibbini, 66 P.2d 675 (Dist. Ct. of App. Cal.
Hl::l7), also involved a no eyewitness head-on collision.
Tlw plaintiff sued her driYer and others and one defendant appealPd the judgment recovered. The right front of
«wlt car was damaged and gonges or scratches on both
:id<•:-; of th<~ center line showed the point of impact. The
l1igliway wa~ bwnt~T-six fe('t wide with eight feet shouldtTO'. rl'lH• Court held the evidence ample to support a
1·Prdict for plaintiff where the physical facts compelled
1

the inference that the appellant was over the center line.
'\'his fact alone was held sufficient to make out a case of

n1·glig-Pnce sufficient to go to the jury. To the same effect
ctr:·
1

In re Starer's Estate, 383 P.2d 956 (Kan.1963); Eller

l "11ited States, 155 F. Supp. 273 (W.D.N.C. 1957) and

IJ11.1;11s 1·.

B11rkr, 257 P.2d 1964 (Kan. 1963). In Briggs
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the rrrial Court nonsuited the plaintiff after presenta
tion of evidence and the Kansas SuprPmc Court reversed.
holding the circumstantial evidence sufficient to go t11
jury. A Buick in which the plaintiff's lrnshand 1vas a t,'ltPil
was hPaded south. Defendant's truck was headed nortl1.
rrhc driver of the Buick was a careful and prudent drinr
and the Buick was in good mechanical condition. Th1'
collision took place in broad daylight on a dry road nnd1'r
no condition which would have impaired road visibilit).
8cveral witnesses observed defendants' heavily loatlPil
truck traveling north before the accident and that it oct'n
sionally crossed the Cl~nter line with its left wheels. Botl1
wrecked vehicles eame to rest on the cast side of the road.
A skid mark forty-four fret long ran from thP

IYPSt ]alJI'

into the east lane to the point wlwre the accidl,nt occurred
Therp ·was a gonge mark one and one-half feet wPsi of tlii
c!'nter lin0. Tlw Buick was apparently headed sontlwa:-1
at tlw tirne ot' the eollision. Its right side was damag~d.
'L'he right front part of the truck had apparently strnti

1

the Buick. An officer fixed the point of impact fon:
fret east of tlw center line. In his opinion the trnck wn ·
mostly on the east side of the road. Another

witlll'Sc

t<:•stifiPd 110 saw a dust eloud from his home aris<' f'row
the accidPnt wltieh a1nwared in the cvnter or just we~t ,,[
thP c<>nter of tl1P rnad. Tht• smiw wi tm·ss tPst if i Pd IH' ~< 1 ''
mud tracks sonth of' tltt• aeeid\'nt 1d1er<> a car liad colllf' 1tll
tlw hig111n1:i· and tl1<>n traveled lmek onto the east :o;itl»
t1H' hip;liwa:i· leaving mrn1 trneb; on th<> mad.

id

1

1

19
'l'he Court observed it was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff to determine
if rPasonable men could come to different conclusions as
to whose negligence could have caused the accident. If it
determined such to be the case, plaintiff's case was suffi(iPnt to go to the jury. The Court held the fact that the
trnck had been observed occasionally crossing the center
line lwfore the accident and conld have been found to have
hPen 1mrtially across the center line at the time of the
accidPnt had a reasonable relation to the accident. The
wPig·ht and probative force of all the evidence were for
th1• j 11r:-·.
'L'lw jmy was compelled to find the driver of the
\'ollrnwagen negligent in crossing or even crowding the
1·enter line under the circumstances presented in the
m:-;tant case. This fact won1d have fully justified the Trial
Court in directing a verdict in favor of the minor children
11[ Constance Hope De Mille.
nrges the Court to accept the statement
of tlH· Iowa Court in Bokhoven v. Hitll, 247 Iowa 604, 75
S.W.2d 225 (1956), as to the standard of proof required
in 1·.a~ws resting on circumstantial evidence. This standard,
h1,1r0ver, ·was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in
lh~fondnnt

ll'ood

11 •

Strevell-Patterson Hardware Co., GUtah 2d 340,

:i:-i l).2d 800 (1957), in which it was held that negligence

1uld h(, inferred from the sole fact the impact took place

11
•

''il

d1'frndant's side of the road. 'l'he rule which is applied
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not only in Utah but by most other jurisdictions is tl1at
the circurnstantial evidence need not exclude any anrl
every other reasonable hypothesis but will be sufficient
if it agrees with the hypothesis it is adduced to prov1.
As between two or more reasonable hypotheses from
circumstantial evidence, the Court is not at liberty to
direct which one the jury must adopt. Briggs v. Burke.
257 P.2d 164 (Kan. 1953).
Defendant urges as true certain opinions of the offi
crs as to the manner in which the Volkswagen made tli1·
skid mark commencing in the W(•st lim•.
Plaintiff submits the jnry was as well able to hypo
thesize the movements of the Y ollrnwagen which madr tlw
mark as the officers once the nature, size and location
of the marks were l)laced in evidence and the location
and <'Xt<>nt of tlw damage to tlw automobile wen.• sl1ow11.
Certainly rPasonahle minds could differ as to tlw r:v
act manner in which snch skid mark was made but the fad
it -was made starting in the west lane whereas the Volks'Nagen came to rest in the east lane is certainly evidenc 1•
from which rmsonable minds could infer that the Voll''
·wagen was across the center line at the time of the colli
sion in violation of the rulPs of the road, its driver

nol

having looked, or having looked, not having seen that
clearly visihl<>, or having looked and seen, not havin~
hn1kc·cl nor tnnwd to m·oid a eollision . Had the Yolk:o

1
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1ragen be€n abiding the rule requiring it to travel as close
to tlrn right hand edge of the roadway as possible, there
would have been at least six or seven feet between it and
thP DeMille automobile. This is so even assuming that
the De Mille automobile was three or even four feet into
the east lane. Had the Volkswagen even been traveling in
the center of its lane, the accident 'would have been
arnided.

Plaintiff submits that it is extremely difficult to
postulate a situation consistent with the facts li1 which
th(' acccident could have happened absent contributing
t·ansative negligence on the part of defendant's decedent.
As a minimum, the evidence was such that reasonable
minds could come to the conclusion that negligence on
tlw part of Frederick Keennth Spendlove proximately

(·ausPd the accident. Certainly this was the opinion of the

Trial Conrt and the jury did come to such a conclusion.
llt·frndant is simply unwilling to allow plaintiff's evidPJH't'

thP reasonable effect to which it is entitled under

the law and ·which it naturally had before a jury, all or
inost

of whom were doubtless drivers themselves.

Def t•ndant's position is plainly untenable for defendant nrges the Court, in effect, to repudiate the rule of
Woad

1.'.

Strevell-Patterson Hardware Co., 6 Utah 2d

:-i±ll, :31:3 P.2d 800 (1957), and to ignore completely the
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presumption of negligence arising from the violation of
rules of the road in process at the moment of the accident.
Morrison v. Perry, 104Utah151, 140 P.2d 772 (1943).
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION
NO. 24.

'11 he evidence hereinabm'e ref erred to was ample
foundation for the giving of all of Instruction 24. Thr
jury conld certainly find defendant's decedent failed to
keep a proper lookout ·when he collided with the Del\Iillr
vehicle on a clear day ·with his visibility unobstructed fo1
several hnndred yards before he reached the point of
imvact. The jury made such a finding on the part of botli
driwrs in Wilson v. Barnes, 224 S."W. 2d 892 (Tex. Ct.
Civ. App. 1949), in a fact situation closely parall0l to tlw
instant case where tlwrc ·was only one hundred yards vi~i
hi I it:; on tlw part of one driver to thP place of impact.

Defendant's dececknt CPrtainly failed to hep his car
under proper control whPre he collided with the DeMilk
car under circumstances fairly shouting that he eithN
failed to make an effort to control or could not snffici<'nt
ly control his own Vl'hicle in avoidance of the accid(•nt.
'11 h0 jnry could have r0asonably inferred from th 1

manner in \Yhich t]1p Yolks\\·agen was damaged tliat it WH-'
trnv<•linp: not <hw north hnt i:;Jightly nortl11:.·ast at the tiuw
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of the collision back into its own lane. This would also
he entirely consistent with the scruff mark, gouges and
skids it made on the road. The only conclusion to be

drawn from such hypothesis would be that the Volkswagen had moved from its proper lane into the west
lane at a point where the collision proved it could not
do so with reasonable safety.
Certainly the evidence supports the conclusion the
\'olkswagen was not entirely within its own lane.
The opinion evidence elicited by defendant from Offi'"'r Burch and Sergeant Reid was to the effect that the
l'ollrnwagen was probably proceeding directly north at
tlw ti1m~ of impact. '!'his evidence coupled with the marks
on the highway support the conclusion the Volkswagen
!'ailed to turn to the right to avoid the collission, failed
to trawl as close to the right hand edge of the road as
p1aeticable and failed to do anything but proceed blindly
:clong- as though thP drivPr "\\'t're asleep.
if one or more of the driving duties set forth
in tlw Instruction had been irrelevant under the evidence,
tlw giving of the instruction was not prejudicial error
when viewed in the context of the instructions as a whole.
lnstrnction 17 required plaintiff to show negligence by a
preponderance of the evidence. Instruction 19 covered
l]ip unavoidable accident possibility. Instruction 20
;;tu.tecl the inapplicability of res ipsa loquitor. Instruction
•:: informed th(' jury that no exceptional caution was
]<~yen
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rrqnired on tl10 part of the defrndant's drcedent. Imtn 1,
tion 2-1 again emphasized that both negligf•nce in one ur
more particulars and proximate cause had to exist before
plaintiff was rntit!Pd to r<>covPr.
None of the cases cited by defendant under Point
II of dPfendant's brid" :;;how Prror in Instruction 24 and
a r<' mu ppropos.

Jackson v. Colston, 11() Utah 295, 209 P.2cl :i111~
( 1!)-1!)), was snit for burns invoh·ing n·s i psa loqni tor a11:!
a difficnlt proximate canse issue. Dern l11veslllu'1it Cu. 1.
Carbon County J,a11rl Co., 9·1 Ftah 7G, 75 P.2d GGO (lU:J~,. ·
was a snit on a notl> and mortgag<•, an l'qnity casl'. 87iidrl
I'. Utah Li_r1lit & Trnctio11 Co ... !J9 lltah 307, 105 P.Jcl :;1;
(I ~HO), involnd tlw l'Pading of the complaint and statut1·
to tl1P jury, ll<'ithn of 1d1id1 thP 'I1rial Court did 11Pr
P({rk('r 1·. J:11ntfJl'r,r;rT, 100 Utah :)\il, 11() I'.:.!cl J'.2::> (1D-l1!. I
was n railroad crossing accident in which a jnry vPrdi1'' '
for tlw plaintiff was affinrn•d on the basis of conflictin~
circumstantial evidenc<' as to tlw speed of the train anr!
propl'r Ol'('ration of thl' crossing signal. 'l'he Supr~11 1
Conrt ohserv<•d that <'ven thongh an instruction as to tit'
neglig<'llCP of tlH• drinr of the car plaintiff was riding ii'
1
•

was e1T01wous since extraneous to the issues, it

\Iii'

harml('SS <'lTOr wlwn vi(•\n•d in tlil' <'Ol11Pxt of tit<• instrw

tions as a wl10!1'. Jlol'l'i.,011 r. Pcrr,1;. 10-~ Utah 151, 1+'
P.:2(1 ( L!J--l::l), invoh <·<1

m1

instrndion

011

control of an nnl

rnoliil(' witl1in 111<' 1:uu_ y of i!Jt• driv<·r's \'ision whil'l1 ll
1

1
'
1
•
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Conrt held inappropriate without discussion. Coray v.
Pacific Co., 119 Utah 1, 223 P.2d 819 (1950),
invuh·ed an erroneous instruction that an employee was
n'qui red to choose a safe method of work. In Moore v.
J!, 11rer & Rio Grande Western Railroad, 4 Utah 2d 255,
~92 P.2d 849 (1956), the Court held the admission of mediial evicknce as to possibilities in error. Johnson v. May1wrd, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 (1959), reversed a
verdid for defendant on the gronnds the evidence made a
taSl' for the jury and that under no view of the evidence
r·rrnlrl plaintiff be fonnd to have assumed a risk.

Su11t71rrn

CONCLFSION

:

rche Trial Court should have found the defendant's
:lr,cedent Frederick Kenneth Spendlove gnilty of negli"l'llC:i' proximately contributing to the accident as a mat11·r of law because the undisputed physical evidence
,\10\n•d him to be in violation of applicable rules of the
1·11Ml dt>signed to prevent collisions at the instant the
1Tid<•nt occurred.
11

not having been done, the Trial Court properly
'llhmitting the case to the jury because reasonable minds
•·iinl<l rE>asonably find from the circumstantial evidence
~'his

1

rioduced that negligence on the part of defendant's de-

'"dPnt was a proximate cause of the collision and the loss
.,f tho mother of the two small children represented by
ilainti ff.
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Dl·l'vndani. ha:-; not :-;hmn1 C'rror m th<· in~lrmti:i1
and ii vrrnr ti}('!'\' lw it wa:-; l1arml<>ss in Yi('\\' of tJ:i. :1
stn1etion:-; wh<·n \'iewed a:-; a wholP >vhicli \\ ('J'P VP!')' im111
ahl<' to tliP <l(•frndant.

'i'lH' jndg111Pnt of the Trial Court should])(_> affirn11"I
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